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Abstract
The United States Supreme Court brought new prominence to Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion doctrine in 2004 when it announced its testimonial interpretation in Crawford v. Washington.
This essay describes how confrontation doctrine was changed in the last decade by Crawford and
the Court’s subsequent decisions in Davis v. Washington and Giles v. California. It examines what
the disagreements among the five opinions in Giles suggest about whether the Court will continue
to rely so strongly on historical hearsay doctrine to interpret the Confrontation Clause. It discusses
other confrontation issues the Supreme Court will face in future cases.
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The most notable event for Sixth Amendment confrontation doctrine in the 
last decade was the 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Washington.1  Justice Scalia's majority opinion declared that the Court had strayed 
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause because the rationale in Ohio 
v. Roberts2 allowed the prosecution to use all kinds of hearsay evidence upon a 
judicial finding that it was reliable.  Justice Scalia announced that the historical 
evidence showed that the Clause was directed at excluding "testimonial" statements 
of declarants who did not testify at trial.3  Under the Crawford interpretation, 
testimonial statements could not be used by the prosecution unless the absent 
declarant was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.  Justice Scalia conceded that his Crawford opinion did not provide a 
comprehensive definition of "testimonial" but he declared that interim uncertainty 
until the Court could decide additional cases was better than the inherent 
unpredictability produced by Roberts.4  
The 7-2 vote in Crawford created the impression that Justice Scalia's 
testimonial theory of confrontation had firmly set the Supreme Court on a new 
course.  Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that it was not necessary to reject Roberts to 
decide Crawford and that the new testimonial theory was not a clearly better reading 
of the historical evidence than in prior opinions, but only Justice O'Connor joined his 
concurring opinion.5   
When the Court returned to confrontation doctrine two years later in Davis v. 
Washington,6 neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justice O’Connor was serving on 
the Court.  Once again Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court; it provided 
more detailed guidance on whether a victim's statement to law enforcement was 
testimonial or nontestimonial.  Justice Scalia had even stronger support in Davis from 
an 8-1 vote; no other Justice joined Justice Thomas's opinion in which he argued that 
the “testimonial” label should apply only to formalized statements to the police and 
not to statements during informal police questioning.7  
This year, Justice Scalia again announced the judgment of the Court when it 
addressed forfeiture of confrontation rights by wrongdoing in Giles v. California.8  
Justice Scalia concluded in his opinion that there was a founding-era forfeiture 
exception to the right of confrontation, but that it applied "only when the defendant 
                                                 
1
  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2
  448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
3
  541 U.S. at 50-53. 
4
  Id. at 68 n. 10. 
5
  Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring). 
6
  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
7
  547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
8
  128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
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engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying."9  While the vote 
to vacate the California judgment was 6-3, Justice Scalia did not have as much 
support for his reasoning as he had in Crawford or Davis.  Instead, the Justices 
explained their views in five different opinions.  Justice Scalia was fully supported by 
only Chief Justice Roberts.  Justice Thomas and Justice Alito joined Justice Scalia's 
opinion, but each also wrote separately to argue for a narrower definition of a 
testimonial statement that Justice Scalia did not accept.10  Justice Souter was joined 
by Justice Ginsburg in an opinion that concurred with Justice Scalia in part; Justice 
Souter declared that the historical evidence alone did not provide adequate detail to 
answer the question raised by Giles and provided his own view on how the forfeiture 
rule should work in practice.11  Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by 
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy; it rejected Justice Scalia's standard and sought 
common ground with Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg on the operation of the 
forfeiture rule.12   
The last time the Justices wrote as many opinions in a confrontation case as 
they did in Giles was in 1999 in Lilly v. Virginia.13  In retrospect, Lilly provided more 
notice than was appreciated at the time that the Court was ready to reformulate 
confrontation doctrine.  While it was not possible to predict in 1999 whose view 
would prevail, the opinions in Lilly sent a clear signal that some Justices had doubts 
about the direction in which confrontation doctrine was then developing.  Justice 
Scalia's latest opinion in Giles continues to show his confident rejection of any 
similar doubt about Crawford's testimonial interpretation, but the votes of the other 
eight Justices may tell a different story.  As a result, assessing the future direction of 
confrontation doctrine requires attention to the views of individual Justices.  
It may not take long to learn what the multiple opinions in Giles could mean 
for the future direction of confrontation doctrine.  The Supreme Court will hear 
argument in November in Melendez-Diaz, a case from Massachusetts in which a 
defendant objected on confrontation grounds to the State's use of a forensic 
laboratory report in a drug prosecution without calling the analyst as a witness.14  The 
defendant's objection was overruled in the trial court on the basis of Massachusetts 
precedent that permitted the prosecution to use a drug analysis certificate as a 
                                                 
9
  Id. at 2683. 
10
  Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring). 
11
  Id. at 2694 (Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part). 
12
  Id. at 2695 (Breyer, Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
13
  527 U.S. 116 (1999); id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. 
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment). 
14
  Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct.) (unpublished opinion available 
at 2007 WL 2189152); rev. denied, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007); cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (Mar. 
17, 2008) (No. 07-591). 
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business record of the laboratory.15  That precedent had been grounded in part on a 
brief description in Crawford of business records as an example of a nontestimonial 
statement.16  
The opinions in Giles suggest that it is unlikely the Justices will consider the 
brief mention of business records in Crawford as sufficient to resolve the issue in 
Melendez-Diaz.  There had been a similar brief endorsement of the forfeiture rule in 
both Crawford17 and Davis,18 but none of the Justices in Giles thought they were 
limited by what Crawford said about forfeiture.  The opinions in Melendez-Diaz may 
again present different readings of the historical record as well as a continuation of 
the debate about whether the historical record alone can provide a sufficient 
foundation for answering every confrontation question that may arise in modern 
criminal prosecutions.  
This Article will review the last ten years of confrontation doctrine and 
consider what might lie ahead for some topics the Court has not yet addressed.  Part I 
will outline confrontation doctrine before it was revised by Crawford.  Part II will 
discuss the effect of Crawford and subsequent cases.  Part III will examine the 
questions that were raised by Giles in 2008.  Part IV will describe the issues the 
Court will face later this year in Melendez-Diaz.  Part V will describe other important 
topics the appellate courts have been addressing as they wait for further guidance 
from the Supreme Court.  
I.  Confrontation Doctrine Before Crawford 
The modern era of confrontation doctrine began in 1965 when the Supreme Court 
held that the Confrontation Clause applied to state criminal trials.19  At the beginning 
the Court found it sufficient to decide most confrontation cases on their facts without 
adopting an overall theory of confrontation.  Some early cases held that there was a 
confrontation violation if the prosecution used a confession from an accomplice who 
did not testify at trial,20 but no violation if the accomplice did testify.21  Other early 
cases held that there was a confrontation violation if the prosecution used prior 
testimony of a witness who did not appear at trial,22 but no violation if the witness 
                                                 
15
  Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *4, citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 
2005). 
16
  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
17
  Id. at 62. 
18
  547 U.S. at 833. 
19
  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
20
  Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
21
  Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622. 
22
  Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
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could be cross-examined at trial.23  There was also no violation if the witness was 
unavailable and the defendant had examined or cross-examined the witness when the 
prior testimony was given.24  Later the Court began to address other kinds of hearsay 
statements, holding that there was no confrontation violation if the out-of-court 
statement used by the prosecution was a co-conspirator statement25 and no violation 
if the out-of-court statement was an excited utterance.26   
Even the 1980 opinion of Justice Blackmun in Roberts was consistent in its 
result with what he described as the Court's practice up to that time of developing 
confrontation doctrine in "the common-law tradition, . . . building on past decisions, 
drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions."27  Justice 
Blackmun devoted much of his Roberts opinion to describing the specific facts of the 
case and explaining why the Court's precedent in California v. Green allowed the 
prosecution to use the preliminary hearing testimony of the missing witness.28  His 
explanation relied on the examination of the witness by defense counsel at the 
preliminary hearing as sufficient to provide confrontation.  Justice Blackmun 
explicitly said that confrontation analysis did not depend on the inherent reliability or 
unreliability of the prior testimony that was offered by the prosecution against the 
defendant.29   
Why then did Justice Scalia dramatically reject the reliability test of Roberts 
in his Crawford opinion?  The foundation for the reliability test did not come from 
the holding of Roberts, but rather from Justice Blackmun's brief discussion of a 
"general approach" to confrontation doctrine that he derived from the Court's 
decisions.  
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination 
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he 
is unavailable.  Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability."  Reliability can be inferred without 
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.30 
Justice Blackmun did not rely on his own general theory to explain the outcome in 
                                                 
23
  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
24
  Id.; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
25
  United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
26
  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
27
  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
28
  Id. at 70-73. 
29
  Id. at 73. 
30
  Id. at 66.  
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Roberts.  Therefore Justice Blackmun’s Roberts opinion did not explain which 
hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted and did not describe how to identify a 
particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.  
No Supreme Court decision fully adopted the general theory described in 
Roberts.  Both Justice Powell in Inadi31 and Chief Justice Rehnquist in White32 
narrowed the application of Roberts by limiting its language about unavailability to a 
case involving prior testimony.  Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked the Roberts 
language about firmly rooted exceptions in discussing co-conspirator statements in 
Bourjaily33 and excited utterances in White,34 but neither opinion provided a test for 
determining which exceptions might be firmly rooted.  Justice Brennan in Lee35 and 
Justice O'Connor in Wright36 discussed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, 
but each case concluded that the evidence was not admissible so neither opinion had 
to define adequate guarantees of trustworthiness.   
The strongest effort to build confrontation doctrine on Roberts was made by 
Justice Stevens in Lilly.37  The vote to reverse Lilly's conviction was unanimous, but 
only three other Justices joined the explanation Justice Stevens based on Roberts.38  
Four other opinions provided different explanations.39  As a result, the Supreme 
Court ended the twentieth century with a body of confrontation opinions that 
addressed particular facts.  The opinions had variously used, narrowed, or ignored the 
language about reliability from Roberts, but the Justices had not found a consensus 
on an overall theory of confrontation.  That meant that trial and appellate courts had 
to rule on situations the Supreme Court had not yet addressed and had to apply the 
language of the Court’s opinions to facts the Justices may not have had in mind.  
II.  Crawford and The Evolution of the Testimonial Interpretation  
Crawford v. Washington40 announced a new interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause to organize confrontation doctrine.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia 
discussed English legal history from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, colonial 
                                                 
31
  United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-94 (1986). 
32
  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992). 
33
  Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987). 
34
  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-36 note 8 (1992). 
35
  Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-46 (1986). 
36
  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816-23 (1990). 
37
  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
38
  Id. at 120 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.). 
39
  Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. (Thomas, J., concurring); 
id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the judgment).  See generally 
Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syr. 
L. Rev. 87, 93-103 (2003). 
40
  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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history, the debates over ratification of the United States Constitution, and early state 
court experience.41  From these sources he concluded that the Clause was directed at 
the use of ex parte out-of-court examinations as evidence against the defendant.42  
Justice Scalia described such statements as “testimonial;” he offered three slightly 
different definitions of a "testimonial" statement but did not state which was most 
accurate.43  He identified a statement to a police officer during interrogation as 
testimonial under any definition, without providing a definition of "interrogation" 
because the facts of Crawford involved structured police questioning that was an 
interrogation under any conceivable definition.44  Justice Scalia also concluded that 
the original meaning of the Clause required excluding any testimonial statement if 
the declarant did not appear as a witness at trial, unless the declarant was unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.45  
Justice Scalia described the testimonial interpretation as necessary to correct 
two problems with the Court's prior confrontation doctrine based on Roberts:  the test 
under Roberts was too broad because it applied to all out-of-court statements, and its 
effect was too narrow because it allowed the prosecution to use a testimonial 
statement as long as the trial court found it was reliable.46  Justice Scalia did note that 
the Court itself had not been led very far astray by Roberts.47  However, some 
appellate courts were routinely allowing prosecutors to use accomplice confessions, 
grand jury testimony, and accomplice plea allocutions upon a finding that the hearsay 
was reliable.  Justice Scalia concluded that the reliability standard had not provided 
meaningful protection because the tests for reliability that had been developed by the 
appellate courts were amorphous, subjective, and unpredictable.48   
Crawford made clear that a critical issue would be the scope of the definition 
of a testimonial statement.  At the core of the various definitions quoted by Justice 
Scalia were prior testimony, affidavits, and depositions; each was a situation in which 
the declarant was providing evidence under oath.49  The facts of Crawford itself 
established that custodial interrogation by the police would produce a testimonial 
statement.  For some other statements the exact scope of the testimonial category was 
left unclear.  For example, Crawford quoted both a definition that depended on the 
expectation of the declarant that a statement would be used prosecutorially and a 
definition that depended on the reasonable belief of an objective observer that the 
                                                 
41
  Id. at 43-50. 
42
  Id. at 50-51. 
43
  Id. at 51-52. 
44
  Id. at 53 n. 4. 
45
  Id. at 53-54. 
46
  Id. at 60. 
47
  Id.  
48
  Id. at 63. 
49
  Id. at 51-52. 
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statement would be available for trial.50  
Crawford had an immediate impact, particularly in the cases in which the 
prosecution had used a statement of an accomplice who did not appear at trial.  
Appellate courts that had been relying on Roberts to allow the prosecution to use 
grand jury testimony and plea allocutions without cross-examination changed course 
after Crawford and found admission of that kind of evidence to be a confrontation 
violation.51  Four years after Crawford this appears to have become a permanent 
change.  
The Supreme Court gave its first guidance on the scope of Crawford in 
Washington v. Davis, when it addressed confrontation rules for a victim's statement 
to law enforcement.52  In his Davis opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia put less 
emphasis on the belief or expectation of either the declarant or the police officer 
about any use of the statement; he put more emphasis on the purpose of the particular 
interrogation.  He described a statement as nontestimonial if "the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."53  He 
described a statement as testimonial when there is no ongoing emergency and "the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution."54  Justice Scalia avoided the issue of whose 
perspective mattered by describing the test as based on objective circumstances. 
The result in Davis provided some illustrations of what the Court meant by an 
ongoing emergency.  In Davis the declarant made the challenged statements to a 911 
operator just after her assailant hit her and ran out the door.  Justice Scalia described 
the statement in Davis as not testimonial because the declarant was seeking police 
assistance for an ongoing emergency, when the declarant still faced a "bona fide 
physical threat" because the assailant could return.55  In the companion case of 
Hammon v. Indiana, the complainant made the statements to responding police 
officers after the officers had separated the suspect from the complainant.  Justice 
Scalia described the statement in Hammon as testimonial because the emergency had 
ended when the police officers secured the scene of the assault and took control of 
the suspect.56  Justice Scalia rejected the state court’s position that "virtually any 
'initial inquiries' at the crime scene" would produce nontestimonial statements.57  He 
said that initial inquiries would often produce nontestimonial statements, but that the 
                                                 
50
  Id. 
51
  See, e.g., United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 98 (2nd Cir. 2008); United States v. Bruno, 383 
F.3d 65, 78 (2nd Cir. 2004).  
52
  547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
53
  Id. at 822. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. at 826-27. 
56
  Id. at 829-30. 
57
  Id. at 832. 
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response to an initial inquiry would be testimonial if the statements of a victim were 
"neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately 
to end a threatening situation."58  In addition, Justice Scalia rejected the argument by 
Justice Thomas that the right of confrontation was limited to formal police 
interrogation.59   
The emphasis on the immediate threat to the declarant also meant that the 
Davis definition of an emergency did not include the risk the suspect would commit 
the same harm in the future.  Justice Scalia and the other seven Justices in the 
majority clearly did not accept the argument by Justice Thomas in his separate 
opinion that the police response to the emergency could include determining whether 
the suspect posed a continuing danger who might continue the assault after the police 
left.60  A similar argument for a broader definition of an "emergency" had been made 
by the State in its brief in Hammon61 and by the Solicitor General in an amicus 
brief.62  
Davis had an immediate impact on the decisions of other appellate courts.  
Appellate courts have found that a statement is not testimonial if the victim was 
reporting an ongoing crime.63  They have found that a statement is not testimonial if 
it was made to the police before the officers were able to secure the scene.64  Other 
appellate courts have found that a statement is testimonial because it reported a past 
crime and there was no emergency still in progress.65 
Even clear doctrinal statements in a Supreme Court opinion must still be 
interpreted by other courts.  Many appellate opinions compare the facts of a case with 
the facts of Davis to determine if the statement was made while the declarant was 
facing an immediate emergency,66 but some opinions rephrase the language of Davis. 
For example, one court concluded that statements were nontestimonial because they 
                                                 
58
  Id. 
59
  Id. at 830; see id. at 834, 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
60
  Id. at 834, 840-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
61
  Brief of Respondent State of Indiana at 10-11, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
62
  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent State of Indiana at 10-11, 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
63
  E.g., Key v. State, 657 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299 
(Mass. 2008). 
64
  E.g., People v. McKinney, 2008 WL 2031350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Long v. United States, 940 
A.2d 87 (D.C.  2007); State v. Shea, 2008 WL 3491404 (Vt. 2008). 
65
  E.g., Cuyuch v. State, 2008 WL 4286646 (Ga. 2008); Allen v. Commonwealth, 2008 WL 2484952 
(Ky. 2008); State v. J.A., 949 A.2d 790 (N.J. 2008); Zapata v. State, 232 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2007). 
66
  E.g., Lewis v. United States, 938 A.2d 771 (D.C.  2007); State v. Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2008); People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007); State v. Graves, 157 P.3d 295 
(Ore. 2007). 
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were made during a "continuing emergency situation," a phrase the court used to 
allow the prosecution to use a statement that was made after the suspect was under 
control in handcuffs.67  In other cases courts use the description of an "ongoing" 
domestic or emergency situation as a sufficient label even though the facts in the 
opinion suggest that the declarant was not facing a threat at the time.68  For example, 
one court said there was an emergency when an officer asked a bystander for help 
while seeking a car that had turned into a residential subdivision shortly after the 
officer=s radar indicated the car was speeding.69  Other courts may discuss whether 
there was an emergency when the statement was made, but suggest as well that a 
statement is nontestimonial as long as it is a response to "unstructured 
interrogation."70  
Some appellate courts also have used a broad interpretation of what it means 
to resolve an emergency.  For example, one court described assessing the scene and 
resolving the emergency as including police efforts "to get information from the 
crime victim, calm her down, and relay information to other officers to apprehend a 
potentially dangerous suspect . . . to protect the public."71  Another court described a 
statement as nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the police was 
determining whether the perpetrator had been apprehended and the emergency 
situation ended.72  These standards could extend the scope of an emergency well 
beyond any resemblance to the facts of Davis, but so far the Court has not reviewed 
whether these courts are properly extrapolating from Davis to new facts not 
considered in Davis. 
Crawford left another issue undecided:  whether the Confrontation Clause 
imposes any limits on the prosecution use of a nontestimonial statement.  Justice 
Scalia said in Crawford that testimonial hearsay was at least the primary object of the 
Clause.73  He left open two possible rules for nontestimonial hearsay by suggesting 
that such hearsay might still be governed by Roberts or that it might not be subject to 
the Confrontation Clause at all.74   Justice Scalia was more direct in Davis, describing 
testimonial hearsay as both the core and the perimeter of the coverage of the 
Confrontation Clause.75  The Court finally made a definite statement about 
                                                 
67
  State v. Buckenberger, 984 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
68
  E.g., State v. Bonvillain, 2008 WL 2064978 (La. Ct. App. 2008); People v. Thompson, 2007 WL 
2141416 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). 
69
  Segel v. State, 2008 WL 4140268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
70
  E.g., People v. Osorio, 81 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
71
  State v. Koslowski, 2007 WL 1719930 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).  See also State v. Riley, 2007 WL 
625898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
72
  People v. Romero, 187 P.3d 56, 81 (Cal. 2008). 
73
  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004). 
74
  Id. at 68. 
75
  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006). 
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confrontation limits on a nontestimonial statement in 2007 in Whorton v. Bockting, a 
case in which there was no nontestimonial statement.76  Nevertheless, in order to 
address whether Crawford was retroactive, Justice Alito had to examine how 
Crawford differed from Roberts.  In that discussion he stated that under Crawford 
"the Confrontation Clause has no application to [nontestimonial] statements . . ."77   
That statement appears to explicitly confirm the suggestions in Crawford and Davis 
that there might be no confrontation limits on a nontestimonial statement.  
The confirmation in Bockting that there is no confrontation limit on  
prosecution use of a nontestimonial statement appears to make the definition of a 
testimonial statement an all-or-nothing issue.  Rejecting any room for flexibility in 
confrontation doctrine means that every new issue will test the Court's commitment 
to the testimonial interpretation.  
III.  Forfeiture of the Right of Confrontation  
The Supreme Court addressed forfeiture of the right of confrontation in 2008 in Giles 
v. California.78  By that time the Court had signaled twice that a forfeiture rule was 
part of confrontation doctrine.  In Crawford, Justice Scalia had described "the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)" as part of confrontation doctrine.79  In 
Davis he provided a similar endorsement, but he did not try to define a standard for 
finding forfeiture.80  
The primary issue that divided the Court in Giles was the standard for finding 
forfeiture.  The defendant in Giles was charged with murdering his girlfriend; he 
testified the shooting was self-defense.  At trial, the prosecution introduced 
statements the victim had made to a police officer who responded to an earlier 
domestic violence call.  The State conceded the statements were testimonial, but the 
California courts held that the defendant had forfeited his confrontation objection by 
killing the declarant.  Justice Scalia started his analysis from the proposition in 
Crawford that any confrontation exception had to be recognized at the time of the 
founding.81  He surveyed the historical evidence and concluded that the forfeiture 
exception applied only when the defendant's conduct was designed to make the 
declarant unavailable.82  He further described the standard as requiring purpose83 or 
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intent;84 causing the declarant to be absent would not suffice if the defendant did not 
do so to keep the declarant from testifying at trial.85   
Justice Scalia’s opinion was supported in full by only Chief Justice Roberts.  
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that intentionally committing a 
wrongful act should suffice to forfeit confrontation rights if the likely consequence 
was that the declarant could not testify.86  Justice Breyer was supported by only 
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy.  The reasoning of the other Justices complicates 
the task of interpreting Giles.  Justice Scalia drew two more votes for vacating the 
California judgment from Justice Thomas and Justice Alito; both said they agreed 
with Justice Scalia's conclusions about forfeiture but would not have reached that 
issue if California had argued that the statement was not testimonial.87  Justice Scalia 
drew two additional votes to vacate the California judgment from Justice Souter and 
Justice Ginsburg.  Justice Souter said in his concurring opinion that he was not 
persuaded by Justice Scalia's examination of the historical record but agreed with his 
conclusion on the grounds of logic and policy.88 
The opinions in Giles also provided three views on how a prosecutor in a 
domestic violence case could prove that the defendant had the purpose to prevent the 
declarant from testifying.  Justice Scalia stated that the evidence of the defendant's 
purpose could include the facts about the abusive relationship of the defendant and 
declarant; he did not state that those facts would be sufficient.89  Justice Souter 
suggested the requisite purpose or intent could be inferred in any classic abusive 
relationship.90  Justice Breyer argued that intentional misconduct should suffice for 
forfeiture if the defendant should have known that it would prevent the declarant 
from testifying.91  He also suggested that Justice Scalia's approval for using evidence 
from an abusive relationship would allow courts to find purpose from evidence of 
intent in a domestic violence case.92  The distinctions among the three positions may 
become blurred as appellate courts translate Giles into practical rules for trial courts.  
After Giles, some courts have rejected forfeiture arguments where the evidence did 
not show why the defendant acted,93 so Justice Scalia's insistence that there must be 
evidence of the defendant's purpose may prompt prosecutors to present some 
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evidence about the specific relationship so that judges are not forced to rely 
exclusively on stereotypes.  
The topic that is particularly of interest for the future development of 
confrontation doctrine is the way the Justices divided themselves into at least three 
groups with differing views on how strictly the Court should be bound by historical 
practice when it addresses a new confrontation issue.  Justice Scalia continued to be 
the strongest advocate of closely following history; he repeated the statement from 
Crawford that the Sixth Amendment did not allow any "open-ended exceptions" to 
the right of confrontation.94  He rejected Justice Breyer's dissent as a "thinly veiled 
invitation to overrule Crawford and adopt an approach not much different from the 
regime of Ohio v. Roberts,  . . . under which the Court would create the exceptions 
that it thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee, 
regardless of how that guarantee was historically understood."95   
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion presented the greatest contrast to Justice 
Scalia's reliance on history, even though Justice Breyer said it was "important to 
recognize the relevant history" and he agreed with Justice Scalia that an exception for 
forfeiture was established at the time of the founding.96  Justice Breyer's argument for 
a broader forfeiture rule went beyond the common law history by relying as well on 
basic purposes and objectives of the rule, similar equitable principles, an interest in 
avoiding evidence rules that are difficult to apply in practice, and an interest in 
avoiding incongruous or anomalous confrontation rules.  He argued that lowering the 
confrontation barrier would allow the States to be more flexible in regulating the 
admission of hearsay "where the need is significant and where alternative safeguards 
of reliability exist."97  
Justice Souter created a middle position between Justice Scalia and Justice 
Breyer by joining all of Justice Scalia's opinion except for Part II-D-2, the section in 
which Justice Scalia suggested that Justice Breyer wanted to abandon Crawford and 
go back to Roberts.98  Justice Souter did not endorse Justice Scalia's reliance on the 
historical record alone because he found there were too few cases to answer the 
particular question in Giles.99  Justice Souter relied instead on his conclusion that 
Justice Breyer's version of forfeiture was based on near circularity in reasoning that 
would in practice lead back to the reliability interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause that had been rejected in Crawford.100  Justice Souter's willingness to look 
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beyond the historical record might resemble Justice Breyer's argument for adding 
policy to history, but Justice Souter supported Justice Scalia's result in Giles; Justice 
Scalia did not comment on Justice Souter's explanation.  
Justice Thomas presented a fourth position that cuts across the other three 
rather than being located along the same axis.101  Although he concurred with Justice 
Scalia's opinion and did not question the importance of allowing only historically 
recognized exceptions, the approach of Justice Thomas could align him with Justice 
Breyer in a case with different facts.  The argument of Justice Thomas that informal 
police questioning does not produce a testimonial statement is based on an 
interpretation of the historical evidence that would leave informal statements to be 
regulated by state evidence rules.  For informal statements, that would sometimes 
produce the same result as Justice Breyer's argument for adopting an easier standard 
for forfeiture that would leave more statements subject only to state evidence rules.  
Justice Alito's brief concurrence raising a similar question about the scope of the 
testimonial category suggests that Justice Thomas may have gained a new ally for his 
position.102  
The publication of these different views suggests that the Justices were 
looking ahead in Giles.  They may have been looking ahead already when it was 
argued.  At oral argument, Justice Breyer was asking whether the Court had to 
incorporate every detail of the common law into confrontation doctrine when Justice 
Scalia interjected that the question had been answered in Crawford, and that 
Crawford was "[a] case from which [Justice Breyer] dissented."103  It took a few 
more exchanges before Justice Breyer could correct that misstatement by declaring:  
"I joined Crawford, and Justice Scalia would like to kick me off the boat, which I'm 
rapidly leaving in any event, but the --  (Laughter.)"104  The Giles opinions do not 
identify any specific cases the Justices might have been anticipating, but there are at 
least two candidates.  
One confrontation issue the Justices may have had in mind in deciding Giles 
is whether there are any limits on the prosecution use of forensic test results without a 
witness.  The Supreme Court had already granted the petition for certiorari in 
Melendez-Diaz on March 17, 2008, a month before Giles was argued on April 22.105  
A second confrontation issue the Justices may have had in mind is prosecution use of 
hearsay statements of children in child abuse cases and sexual abuse cases.  Two 
amicus briefs in Giles specifically presented arguments for admitting such statements 
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that ranged far beyond the issue of forfeiture.106  Prior to announcing Giles the 
Supreme Court had recently denied petitions for certiorari in at least three child sex 
abuse cases.107  The Court had also recently denied another petition for certiorari in a 
murder case involving a hearsay statement of a three-year old child in which the state 
court had concluded that the child’s statement was testimonial.108  
IV.  The Next Issue:  Experts and Certificates  
The Supreme Court will address a new confrontation issue in November when it 
hears Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.109  In this case, the defendant was arrested for 
selling cocaine by detectives acting on a tip.  At his trial, the prosecution evidence 
included nineteen baggies containing a white powder.  Instead of having an analyst 
testify about the contents of the baggies, the prosecution presented a drug analysis 
certificate that stated the baggies contained cocaine.  The trial court overruled 
defendant's confrontation objection and admitted the certificate.  In defendant's 
appeal from his conviction, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected defendant's 
confrontation objection in an unpublished memorandum:  
In Commonwealth v. Verde, [444 Mass. 279 (2005)], the court held 
that certificates of drug analysis did not deny a defendant the right of 
confrontation and were, therefore, not subject to the holding in 
Crawford v. Washington, . . . .  We see no merit to the defendant's 
simple assertions that Verde is contrary to Crawford . . .110  
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review of Melendez-Diaz 
without an opinion,111 so the authoritative statement of Massachusetts law on a drug 
test certificate is still the opinion in Verde.  In Verde, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that state decisions from 1923 and 1969 that had rejected a 
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confrontation objection to certificates of analysis were still valid after Crawford.112  
The Massachusetts court relied on four main reasons.  First, the court explained that 
Crawford had recognized the continued validity of hearsay exceptions that were  
well-established at the framing, and asserted that in Crawford "the Court suggested in 
dictum that a business or official record would not be subject to its holding as this 
exception was well established in 1791."113  Second, the Massachusetts court 
concluded that a certificate should be considered a public record because it was 
neither discretionary nor based on opinion and stated the results of a scientific test.114 
Third, the court described the certificate as only prima facie evidence that a defendant 
may rebut.115  Fourth, the Massachusetts court stated that a certificate was not like an 
ex parte examination that Crawford had said was the primary reason for the 
Confrontation Clause.116  
The divisions among the Justices that were apparent in Giles may appear 
again when the Supreme Court decides Melendez-Diaz.  There is even less chance in 
that case than in Giles that the Court will find clear guidance from history.  The state 
of chemistry as a science in 1791 means there will be no precedent from the time of 
the framing specifically addressing the admissibility of an analyst's certificate of the 
chemical composition of a substance.  Hearsay exceptions for business records and 
public records were still in an early stage of evolution; the records that were admitted 
under the hearsay exceptions were not like a certificate from an analyst who has 
tested contraband.  The sparse historical record means that neither side can show that 
similar certificates were excluded or admitted, but that kind of reliance on history 
does not explain how the Court should decide the case.   
Other state supreme courts and federal appellate courts have added arguments 
to the debate since the Massachusetts court concluded in Verde that a drug analysis 
certificate is not testimonial.  The scope of the debate now extends beyond drug test 
certificates to include similar certificates reporting blood tests in drunken driving 
cases and certificates reporting DNA testing of an item related to a criminal 
prosecution.  The courts that concluded that the prosecution cannot use a certificate 
by itself as proof of the test results have relied on the language and policy of 
Crawford.117  Crawford provided three different definitions of a testimonial 
statement.118  In two of the definitions an affidavit was listed as an example.  In the 
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third definition a testimonial statement was one that objectively was made for use at a 
later trial.  Under all three definitions the certificate in Melendez-Diaz would be a 
testimonial statement..  
Recent appellate opinions have provided four additional arguments why 
Crawford does not bar the prosecution from using a test certificate without testimony 
from the analyst.  Some courts distinguish Crawford with the argument that a lab test 
is neutral and not intended to incriminate or accuse.119  These courts stress that the 
analyst tests an object without knowing anything about the suspect or the rest of the 
case, and that the analysis may also exonerate a suspect.  However, this argument 
often appears to equate the purpose of the test with the purpose of the certificate; it 
appears to lose its force if they are viewed separately.  Even if the testing is objective 
and neutral, the purpose of the certificate is to provide an affidavit the prosecution 
can use to prove its case as a substitute for live testimony.  
A second argument for distinguishing Crawford is that an analyst's certificate 
does not resemble an ex parte examination.120  Of course, it does not resemble the 
custodial interrogation in Crawford or even the noncustodial interrogation in Davis 
or Hammon, but this argument appears to depend on a very cursory comparison.  A 
police officer may not question the analyst in the same way as the officer would 
question a complainant or a witness to a crime, but there is still a question from the 
police to the analyst about the amount and composition of suspected contraband.  The 
analyst knows from experience what information to include in the certificate.  
Crawford did not define interrogation because a recorded statement in response to 
structured police questioning was clearly within any conceivable definition.121  
Justice Scalia said nothing in Crawford about the length of the interrogation, 
especially where the declarant knows only one fact.  However, there may be other 
views on the Court.  The suggestion of Justice Thomas in Giles that only '"a 
formalized dialogue'" could produce a testimonial statement might lead him to 
conclude that the stylized questioning of a lab request means that the certificate is not 
a testimonial statement.122  
A third argument for allowing the prosecution to use the certificate of an 
analyst who does not testify is that Davis excludes any contemporaneous statement 
from the testimonial category.123  This argument describes the certificate as a record 
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of what the analyst is observing about the contraband at the time of the test.  It 
depends on parsing the Davis test into its component parts and assuming that one 
part—the contemporaneous nature of the statement—is sufficient to make the 
certificate nontestimonial.  This argument eliminates the other parts of the Davis test, 
such as the emergency and the declarant's fearful cry for help.  In some opinions, this 
rationale includes an argument that the machine used to test a substance is essentially 
the source of the certificate and that there is no confrontation violation because a 
machine cannot be cross-examined.124   
The final argument for allowing the prosecution to use an analyst's certificate 
is that requiring the analyst to testify in every drug trial would be too burdensome.  
The State's brief in Melendez-Diaz described the potential burden by citing statistics 
about millions of drug cases every year, tens of thousands of felony drug trials every 
year, and backlogs of testing requests in over one hundred thousand drug cases.125  In 
addition, the state contended that most defendants do not really intend to 
cross-examine the analyst, and that those who do cross-examine rarely accomplish 
anything.126  Amicus briefs supported that position at greater length.127   The State’s 
brief in Melendez-Diaz suggested that the defendant’s right to compel the analyst to 
attend should be an adequate alternative to confrontation.128  This final argument for 
avoiding the application of Crawford depends so much on an assumption that test 
certificates are reliable that it might succeed only if the Court overrules or retreats 
from Crawford’s rejection of reliability.  That seems unlikely; even in Crawford the 
Court maintained its record of never overruling any prior confrontation decision.  At 
the same time, the potential burden of requiring analysts to appear at trial may lead 
some Justices to ask if there is a compromise position on test certificates that is still 
consistent with Crawford's interpretation of the historical evidence.  
The effect of Melendez-Diaz on other confrontation questions will depend on 
the outcome, the reasoning in the opinion, how the opinion defines a testimonial 
statement, how strictly the opinion adheres to history, and the extent to which it 
explicitly considers the practical effect of any rule.  Other cases the Court has 
recently declined to review or that are still pending on the Court's docket illustrate 
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some of the questions that are sure to arise after Melendez-Diaz.   The list includes 
drug cases in which a witness did testify about the test results, but the witness was 
not the analyst who tested the drugs.129  It includes similar cases where the witness at 
trial was not the analyst who tested the blood sample in a prosecution for driving 
under the influence130 or the analyst who tested the DNA sample that identified the 
defendant.131   The Court's docket also includes a case in which the appellate court 
concluded that a test certificate was testimonial, but still allowed the prosecution to 
use a test certificate because the defendant had not complied with a state law that 
permitted the defendant to file a timely demand that the prosecution produce the 
analyst at trial.132  There is a pending case where the appellate court rejected a 
confrontation objection to the documents the prosecution used to prove that the 
equipment used by the analyst was properly calibrated.133  Other cases on the Court's 
docket that might be affected by Melendez-Diaz include a case in which the 
testimony of a coroner was based on the autopsy notes of an unavailable doctor.134  
Justice Scalia provided relatively straightforward rules in both Davis and 
Giles, continuing the common-law approach to confrontation doctrine the Court has 
most often used.  If that trend continues, the Court will seek an uncomplicated test to 
resolve Melendez-Diaz, even if the test may not resolve every question raised by 
other cases on the docket.  The Justices may be able to decide Melendez-Diaz without 
the need to reconcile their differing positions on whether to consider policy as well as 
historical practice.  If the Justices do revisit Crawford's reliance on history, they will 
find a rich store of academic commentary on the history of the Confrontation Clause 
from the last decade that refutes Justice Harlan's well-known lament that "the 
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment."135  
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V.  Looking Back and Ahead  
State and federal courts have adapted to Crawford without major problems on many 
confrontation topics, in large part because Crawford did not reverse any Supreme 
Court confrontation decision and left intact almost all of the specific answers the 
Court had previously provided.  There were no pre-Crawford opinions on 
confrontation issues in domestic abuse cases, but the recent focus on domestic abuse 
prosecutions meant that the Court would have been asked eventually to address the 
issue.  Crawford probably sped up the process by giving new prominence to 
confrontation doctrine that encouraged both prosecutors and defense counsel to try 
new methods and to advance new arguments.  The same effect probably explains 
Melendez-Diaz and the large number of cases on the Court's docket that involve test 
results and expert testimony based on hearsay.  Will the Court be able to take a break 
after Melendez-Diaz, or are there other major confrontation questions?  
One topic that is appearing on the Supreme Court docket is confrontation 
limits on hearsay statements of children in child abuse and child sexual abuse cases.  
In 1989, in Idaho v. Wright, the Court reversed a conviction for lewd conduct with a 
minor that was based in part on statements a 2 1/2 year old child made to a 
pediatrician.136  Idaho argued that the child's statements were admissible under the 
state residual hearsay exception; it argued that there was no confrontation violation 
because the content of the statement had particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.137  The majority opinion by Justice O'Connor described the 
pediatrician's examination without stating whether its purpose was treatment or 
prosecution or whether the child made her statements privately or to someone acting 
for the authorities.138  Wright concluded that the prosecution could not show 
guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the Roberts test by corroborating the content 
of the statement, and that the facts did not establish enough other guarantees.139   
In 1992, in White v. Illinois, the Court affirmed a conviction for sexual assault 
that was based in part on statements the four-year old victim made to a nurse and 
doctor.  The statements were admitted under the state's medical examination hearsay 
exception; the Supreme Court limited the grant of certiorari to the confrontation 
question and assumed that the challenged statements fit within the hearsay exceptions 
used by the state courts.  The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that 
there was no confrontation violation because the medical examination exception was 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.  
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia described the Court's prior confrontation cases as 
generally faithful to the testimonial interpretation;140 he did not mention Wright when 
he summarized those prior cases even though he had joined Justice O'Connor's 
opinion.141  In Crawford, Justice Scalia suggested that White's holding that allowed 
the prosecution to use a statement to the police officer might not be consistent with 
the testimonial interpretation, but he said nothing about White's analysis of a 
statement during a medical examination.142  That silence left undecided the question 
of whether every statement to a medical professional would be nontestimonial under 
the new test adopted in Crawford.  Justice Scalia stated in Giles that “statements to 
physicians in the course of receiving treatment” are nontestimonial, but that 
announcement also leaves some unanswered questions. 
The split among appellate courts on whether statements by abused children to 
medical personnel are testimonial has not been addressed by the Supreme Court.  The 
Court denied two recent petitions for certiorari from defendants.  One case sought 
review of the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court that statements for medical 
treatment were not testimonial; the interview of the child at a Children's Resource 
Center had been arranged by the police and a county family services worker.143  A 
similar case sought review of an Ohio Supreme Court case in which the police and 
the government were apparently not involved in arranging the original interview that 
was introduced at trial.144  The Court also denied a recent petition for certiorari in a 
case that reached the opposite result.  In that case the Iowa Supreme Court held that 
statements were testimonial even though they were for medical treatment.  The police 
and a state human services worker had arranged the proffered interview of a child at a 
Child Protection Center.145  The Court denied the petition in another case at the start 
of the term in October.146  There are also many other appellate opinions on each side 
of the dispute about the confrontation limits on prosecution use of a child’s 
statements.  Every judge and lawyer in such cases will undoubtedly read 
Melendez-Diaz closely for any restatement, revision, or extension of Crawford.  
A second issue that might be affected by what Melendez-Diaz may say about 
confrontation doctrine is whether an indirect statement to the police can be 
testimonial.  Some of the questions the courts will face are illustrated by a recent case 
in which a suicide note addressed to the author's parents accused the defendant of 
conspiracy to commit murder.  The suicide note also said that the author was sending 
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the proof to the police.  The prosecution evidence included the suicide note and the 
contents of a briefcase the author of the suicide note had told his brother to look for 
under the author’s bed if anything ever happened to the author.  The Michigan courts 
held that the suicide note was admissible and rejected the defendant's confrontation 
objection.147  In a subsequent habeas action, the United States District Court had first 
to resolve some complex issues about retroactivity and the standard of review.  The 
federal court then concluded that the suicide note was testimonial under Crawford 
and that the state court erred in admitting the note.148  
The federal court evaluated the suicide note under the three definitions of a 
testimonial statement that were quoted in Crawford.149  The suicide note was not a 
formalized statement, but the content provides strong evidence that either the author 
or an objective witness would have expected that the prosecution would use the 
suicide note as evidence.  The report of the United States Magistrate Judge had 
described the suicide note as "more consciously designed to provide incriminating 
evidence" than any hearsay, apart from a formalized testimonial statement such as an 
affidavit or deposition.150  However, the federal court did not mention the possibility 
that the suicide note might be nontestimonial because it was addressed to the author's 
parents and not directly to the police.  Each of the statements in Crawford, Davis, and 
Giles, was made to law enforcement.  Law enforcement would not typically be 
involved in the statements the Court has described as nontestimonial, such as  
“business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy” and “[s]tatements to 
friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in 
the course of receiving treatment.”151  Perhaps the rationale or language the Court 
uses in deciding Melendez-Diaz will provide further guidance on whether a 
nominally private accusation can be a testimonial statement.   
Conclusion 
A decade ago, it might have seemed that confrontation doctrine was becoming so tied 
to the hearsay rule that it served no independent function.  Crawford made the 
Confrontation Clause important again in its own right for prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and judges.  One question rarely mentioned is whether the Confrontation 
Clause requires action from other branches of government as well. The adoption of 
the Confrontation Clause, as well as other parts of the Bill of Rights, was a 
commitment to a particular kind of federal criminal procedure.  The incorporation 
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doctrine extended the obligation to state criminal procedure.  The criminal procedure 
required by the Bill of Rights can appear expensive, particularly if the reasons it is 
required are discounted.  In a case like Melendez-Diaz the additional cost of requiring 
the analyst to testify becomes more apparent.  The briefs in Melendez-Diaz and the 
appellate opinions in similar cases that discuss costs and burdens assume that the 
current systems for testing and the presently available technology are all that is 
possible. Must the courts limit the cost of criminal procedure to the budget they can 
expect, or does the Confrontation Clause also impose an obligation on the legislature 
and executive to develop and fund a law enforcement system that allows the courts to 
follow constitutionally required procedure?   
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